Large language models (LLMs) are becoming integral to web applications and browser agents, transforming online interactions while introducing new attack vectors and reshaping longstanding web vulnerabilities. Classical threats such as cross-site scripting (XSS) can be amplified through LLM-mediated interactions, while LLM-specific vulnerabilities can propagate across web applications, introducing attacks such as prompt injection. Securing modern web systems therefore requires understanding interactions between traditional and LLM-specific threats across the system lifecycle. Unlike prior surveys treating web and LLM security separately, this survey provides a unified analysis of how LLMs amplify web vulnerabilities across client-side, server-side, and pipeline layers while evaluating defenses and their limitations. The analysis examines extending NIST and ISO/IEC AI security frameworks to the security needs of LLM-enabled web environments. Three unresolved challenges are identified: adversarial natural-language instructions, autonomous agent security, and post-deployment security through continuous monitoring and adaptation. An LLM-aware monitoring and control framework is proposed, integrating semantic input validation, prompt integrity protection, output isolation, agent governance, and runtime monitoring. This unified perspective characterizes the evolving threat landscape and outlines future directions for secure AI-enabled web systems.
Nivedita Singh, Alsharif Abuadbba, Yansong Gao et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on information retrieval (IR) systems, such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), to incorporate domain-specific knowledge without costly re-training. These systems often store pre-computed document embeddings in cloud-based vector databases. However, such embeddings are vulnerable to embedding inversion attacks (EIAs), which can reconstruct their underlying text. Existing defenses, such as adding noise or scaling embeddings, often provide limited privacy or significantly reduce retrieval utility. We propose SHAQ (shadow query generation), a semantic-decomposition and embedding-decoupling defense against EIAs. SHAQ is based on the insight that EIAs rely on the strong coupling between an embedding and its original text. Instead of storing document embeddings directly, SHAQ uses a generative language model to create diverse shadow queries that capture different semantic aspects of each document. These queries are then encoded and stored in place of the original document embeddings, thereby decomposing document semantics and decoupling stored embeddings from the source text. Experiments across diverse IR datasets show that SHAQ substantially improves privacy while preserving retrieval utility, achieving a recovery rate as low as 0.2104, defending up to 19.50% more tokens than baseline defenses, and reaching up to 0.7967 MAP@10 with up to 5.53% utility improvement. These results demonstrate that semantic decomposition and embedding decoupling provide an effective alternative to directly modifying embeddings for defending against EIAs.
Xinguo Feng, Zhongkui Ma, Zi-Han Wang et al.· 0 citations
This work presents GraftyVul, a system that constructs vulnerable programs by grafting real-world vulnerabilities into open-source projects, and introduces a language- and context-agnostic semantic embedding that compares vulnerabilities by sink, mechanism and host-feature rather than surface code.
Omri Ram, Mitchell Horner, R. van der Meyden et al.· 0 citations
This work forms sector-targeted CTI dissemination as a multilabel classification problem, leveraging deep field knowledge of CTI structures and sector-specific threat patterns, and applies BERT, a transformer-based model, to automate the mapping of CTI events to sectors.
Fajar Wijitrisnanto, A. Abuadbba, Yan-Song Gao et al.· 0 citations
It is found that developers rarely raised security concerns when engaging with Copilot, and many did not recognize that their final implementations remained insecure, so future research directions to support safer AI-assisted software development are proposed.
Zahra Mousavi, Chadni Islam, M. A. Babar et al.· 0 citations
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