Large Language Model (LLM) agents are turning language into real-world effects, making safety necessary against both indirect prompt injections and direct harmful requests. System-level safety harnesses add an enforcement layer beyond model-level defenses, but existing harnesses are usually designed once by experts and applied across heterogeneous models and domains. Effective protection is deployment-dependent: models differ in how much enforcement they need before utility declines, while domains differ in the effects, state, and action sequences that must be governed. A harness that is strict enough for one model may over-block another, and a policy that transfers across domains may miss application-specific safety relations. We present EvoSafeHarness, a safety-specific optimization framework that synthesizes a deployable harness for a frozen model in a target domain. It jointly searches a natural-language policy and executable code logic, guided by model behavior, domain specifications, and fresh-context adversarial review to reject benchmark-specific rules. Across four agent benchmark families, EvoSafeHarness achieves a stronger safety-utility frontier than fixed expert-designed defenses. On DecodingTrust-Agent, it reduces average attack success rate from 45.6% to 10.0% at a 3.3-point utility cost and achieves the best score in 14 of 15 cells. On AgentDojo, it reaches 82.8% utility at 0.0% ASR, twice CaMeL's utility at the same operating point, and transfers unchanged to unseen AgentDyn suites. It also achieves the best score on Agent-SafetyBench for every victim and keeps mean ASR below 20% under adaptive PAIR attacks with a refinement budget of 16. Analysis shows that domain semantics determine which safety relations and trajectory state are needed, while model and runtime behavior determine how and where those relations should be enforced.
Nanxi Li, Ying-Zi Ma, Yulong Cao et al.· 0 citations
Large language model (LLM) API relays authenticate customers separately but often forward requests through shared provider credentials. Providers scope prompt caches to upstream principals and namespaces, so relay customers mapped to one cache identity can observe each other's cache state. Prior work showed cache sharing at selected endpoints but did not identify which credential, pool, adapter, or nested hop controls the finalidentity. We present KeyPooling, a measurement method that traces customer identity through cache lookup and write, verifies runtime transformations, and tests one predicted identity component at a time. Across five open-source gateways connected to OpenAI and Anthropic, none bound customers to upstream credentials by default; under a shared credential, all five exposed cross-customer cache reads for both providers. Principal and namespace splits, pool associations, and adapter and nested-relay contrasts localized the controlling transformations. In an outcome-independent weekly OpenRouter frame, tests covered 80.5% of eligible token volume and found cross-account reads for 12 of 28 labels carrying 33.7% of volume. On one production route, a controlled procedure recovered eight consecutive target positions without target access. Broader tests identify cache granularity, routing, rate limits, attribution, and budget as conditions for token-by-token recovery, not security controls. We derive a defense contract: every customer must enter a provider-enforced domain, or a namespace derived from authenticated identity must survive every final cache lookup and write. Placing this split after reusable public prefixes preserved most modeled reuse at a 1.7-2.5% cost increase.
Bowen Sun, Yixi Cai, Xiaogeng Liu et al.· 0 citations
