Skip to content

Author

G. Lukyanov

13 papers indexed here

We haven’t gathered this author’s papers yet. Follow them and we’ll fetch their work.

Not the right person? Other researchers publish under this name.

Preprint Sep 2026

Learning to Interpret Forecasts: Evidence Quality and Source Familiarity

We study how learning about a forecasting method affects a seller's choice of evidence. More evidence improves the current forecast but makes the method's persistent component harder to identify. A monopolist may therefore collect less evidence initially to help customers interpret later forecasts. Because the seller c...

G. Lukyanov, Nikita Ogorodnikov · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

The Fiscal Alibi: Hidden Spending Needs and Government Reputation

A government may ask for a high tax because it faces a genuine expense. The same demand can also be made by a government that intends to keep the proceeds. We study this ambiguity in a two-period reputation model with privately observed spending needs and an endogenous tax base. The opportunist chooses between outright...

G. Lukyanov, Hengrina Ly · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Taxing Capital to Protect It

This paper studies the composition of taxation when the government cannot fully commit to respecting private returns after investment. A fiscal authority must finance a given expenditure from labor and capital income. Ordinary tax receipts are protected, but an opportunistic executive can seize part of the remaining ca...

G. Lukyanov, Hengrina Ly · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

The Price of a Familiar Perspective

Access to past reports changes how consumers learn about competing information providers. A subscriber who has learned to interpret a familiar source may find an equally competent rival less useful. We study how opening the rival's archive changes renewal prices and the effect of outcome feedback. Better feedback stren...

G. Lukyanov, Ilya Pototskiy · 1 citation
Preprint Sep 2026

Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection

Global games select a unique cutoff when a player's incentive moves monotonically with private information. We show that this logic can fail when a privately informed participant can take a costly, simultaneous, and unobserved action that defends the status quo. In a currency-attack model, the defender acts only at int...

G. Lukyanov, Yaroslav Yosifov · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2025

Costly Comparison and Informational Inertia

A price cut can attract consumers while changing what their purchases reveal to later buyers. We study this trade-off in a duopoly with common uncertainty about quality. Consumers have a default seller and may pay to obtain access to the rival together with a private signal. Firms observe purchases and retain their pri...

G. Lukyanov, Arina Azova · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Anonymous Accountability

We ask how an expert panel should disclose auditable conflicts of interest when reports are named and experts care about their reputations for ability. Before sealed binary assessments are filed, an auditor commits to disclosing no orientation information, each named expert's orientation, or only the number of experts...

G. Lukyanov, Muslim Salakhov · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Who Enters the Record? Paywalls, Contributor Selection, and Social Learning

This paper studies social learning when buying access to previous decisions also determines whose decision enters the record. Individuals first receive private information and then decide whether to pay for access. A positive price selects relatively weak private beliefs. With one founding observation, every buyer copi...

Maria S. Kovalenko, G. Lukyanov · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Opinions Before Evidence: Dynamic Information Quality and Source Familiarity

New information services begin without a record that teaches customers how to interpret them. We study a two-period monopoly selling standardized forecasts whose committed scoring technology combines noisy evidence with a persistent, initially unknown calibration. More evidence improves a forecast's current decision va...

G. Lukyanov, Nikita Ogorodnikov · 1 citation
Preprint Aug 2026

Effort without Evidence

Advice can determine not only how past evidence is interpreted but whether new evidence will be produced. I study a sequence of decision makers who observe public success or failure but not one another's effort, and who pass costless causal assessments to their successors. Because a sender values success while underwei...

G. Lukyanov · 1 citation

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.