Intrusion detection research in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) heavily depends on public datasets, yet no prior work has systematically assessed whether the collective dataset corpus supports current evaluation claims. This paper addresses this gap through a meta-review of 18 studies between 2019 and 2026, from which 83 ICS, or ICS directly related, cybersecurity datasets are identified, harmonised, and characterised using a unified five-dimensional taxonomy. The taxonomy reveals that the corpus is structurally skewed: 85.5% of datasets concentrate on late-stage OT Disruption tactics, cross-stage IT/OT progression sequences are present in only 8.4% of cases, field-device evidence at Level 0 of the Purdue hierarchy is effectively absent, and operationally sourced data accounts for only 15.7% of the collection. A parallel audit of evaluation practices shows that zero report streaming evaluation, fewer than half apply disciplined train/test partitioning, and only two satisfy reproducibility requirements. Furthermore, a taxonomy-evaluation coupling analysis shows that dataset imbalances constrain the scope and feasibility of several evaluation practices. Based on these findings, we identify three structural imbalances: i) architectural shallowness, ii) progression compression, and iii) cross-domain substitution, and derive a coordinated research agenda which covers cross-stage corpus construction, temporally structured benchmarking, event-level label standards, and governance frameworks for operational data sharing.
Konstantinos E. Kampourakis, Vyron Kampourakis, Georgios Kambourakis et al.· 0 citations
The security of open-source cloud platforms is paramount, given their widespread adoption in modern business operations. This study conducts a large-scale empirical security analysis of the web-based management interfaces of ten widely used open-source Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) platforms. Using a black-box penetration testing methodology that combines automated scanning with Burp Suite and its security extensions with systematic manual analysis, we identified a total of 16 vulnerabilities spanning nine classes, including high-severity flaws that enable account takeover. Our findings, which culminated in the assignment of six new Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs, provide concrete, empirically validated examples of how server misconfigurations and flawed authentication logic manifest in the exposed management interfaces of mainstream open-source IaaS platforms, including mis-issued API tokens, time-based user enumeration, and host-header–driven misrouting. Specifically, the identified vulnerabilities stem from improper authentication, insufficient input validation, and server misconfigurations. In addition to a responsible vulnerability disclosure process, this work provides practical hardening recommendations to mitigate the identified weaknesses.
Alexandros Perrakis, Efstratios Chatzoglou, Vyron Kampourakis et al.· International Journal of Inf...· 0 citations