Zero-trust security continuously re-evaluates the trustworthiness of industrial devices and reacts by rerouting, isolating, or rescheduling traffic. In a time-sensitive network (TSN) that carries feedback control loops, however, every such reaction is itself a control-plane disturbance: a reroute that meets every deadline can still deliver stale measurements, and an optimizer that crashes mid-reconfiguration can leave the network in an undefined state. This paper presents ZTSafe, a scheduling architecture that treats physical safety—not attack blocking—as the object of guarantee. The guarantee has two distinct layers: compliance with the communication contract yields a deterministic invariance result conditional on the stated plant, disturbance, synchronization, and trusted-base assumptions, whereas the risk bound’s 1−δ coverage is an empirical probabilistic calibration result. ZTSafe (i) synthesizes, offline and per control loop, a communication safety contract that bounds delay, age of information (AoI), consecutive losses, jitter, and path risk such that the physical state remains in its safe set under those assumptions; (ii) converts zero-trust evidence into conservative risk upper bounds and couples the admissible path-risk budget to the runtime safety margin of the plant; and (iii) places the scheduling optimizer outside the trusted computing base: an independent runtime shield checks every proposed schedule against the contracts, and on solver timeout, crash, or infeasibility the system atomically switches to a pre-checked fallback instead of executing an unverified approximate solution. Here, “verified” means independently checked by the shield, not machine-verified; a systematic shield defect or compromise of the remaining trusted computing base voids the deterministic claim. On a hardware TSN testbed with three physical control loops and fourteen attack and fault scenarios, ZTSafe reduces safe-set violations by 92.9% relative to the strongest baseline (12.8% to 0.9%; two-proportion z=39.4, p<10−15) while sustaining 94.3% on-time completion of critical traffic, recovers within three control periods, and executes zero unverified configurations across 10,000 injected solver failures.
Hao-Zhe Zhou, Hang Lei, Mao-Lin Yang· Future Internet· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) can turn a flood of cross-layer industrial logs into a fluent incident narrative, but a narrative that cites only real, resolvable events can still be wrong in every relation that matters: the login came from a different workstation, the write command occurred after the physical change it supposedly caused, the action fell inside a planned maintenance window, and the controller does not even actuate the affected process. A cited event is not necessarily supporting evidence. When such a narrative drives automated response, the error propagates into isolating the wrong controller or revoking a legitimate operator. We present EviGuard, a system that decides when an LLM’s understanding is trustworthy enough to act on. EviGuard stores auditable cross-layer evidence in a provenance graph, lets the LLM propose only hypotheses, compiles each hypothesis into atomic machine-checkable claims in an Incident Claim Language, and has an ensemble of deterministic verifiers label every claim supported, contradicted, or unknown against the graph—honoring interval time, event-time policy and credential versions, network reachability, and physical control dependencies. A response gate forbids any high-impact action whose critical preconditions are not all supported. On EviCPS-Bench (42 hardware-in-the-loop attack chains, 9600 claim-level labels, κ=0.87), EviGuard cuts the unsupported-claim rate from 12.6% to 1.7%, raises relation-edge F1 from 0.64 to 0.89, holds prompt-injection success to 0.4%, and executes zero unverified high-impact actions across 3200 response decisions, at a median end-to-end latency of 0.44 s.
Hao-Zhe Zhou, Hang Lei, Mao-Lin Yang· Applied Sciences· 0 citations
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