LLM agents that read untrusted content can be hijacked by prompt injections. Runtime monitors that try to catch a hijack before the agent acts, and benchmarks that score each task with a single run, share an assumption: whether an agent follows an injection is settled when the injection is read. We test this assumption...
It is shown that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance.
Hindsight Memory-PRM exploits this audit trail twice: offline to train an operation-conditioned memory-utility critic, and online, where retrievals, citations, and one controlled deletion-and-reanswer per probe settle an intervention-calibrated entry-level presence credit.
H. Jia, Yang Liu, Ying-Guang Yang et al.· 0 citations
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