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Huacan Wang

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Preprint Aug 2026

SemaPLC: A Project-Grounded, Verification-Gated Agent Harness for PLC Code Generation

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) run industrial plants, and large language models can already generate independent program organization units (POUs) for them. Whether such logic integrates into an existing PLC project and then runs correctly has been checked only in limited tests. We present \textsc{SemaPLC}, a project-grounded and verification-gated agent harness assembled from conventional tools but governed by a strict completion rule. Rather than stopping when the model judges its own output adequate, \textsc{SemaPLC} declares a task complete only when logged external checks confirm it. Those checks cover the specification, the compilation, and the behavior on a live runtime. On 117 independent-POU tasks matching existing benchmarks, it attains the highest strict verified pass rate on all seven models (72.6\% mean). On a project-context track of 65 tasks whose generated logic must compile and run inside a real project, it attains the highest mean on integrated compilation, static behavior, and dynamic behavior. Of the three layers, dynamic behavior is the most revealing. We measure it by deploying the generated and the reference logic to a live PLC runtime and comparing their executed traces. All methods fall within 10 static points of one another, whereas dynamic scores separate them sharply, from 22.4 to 31.4 for the baselines against 52.2 for \textsc{SemaPLC}. Overall, our verification-gated harness raises the mean at every layer and most sharply at runtime. Execution, not static scoring, is the faithful test of whether generated control logic actually works. \textsc{SemaPLC} is open-sourced at https://github.com/midea-ai/SemaPLC.

Yanlun Tu, Huacan Wang, Ziyue Zhou et al. · 0 citations
Conference Open access 2026

SafetyMem: Adaptive Jailbreak Defense via Dual-Component Safety Memory

Current defenses for Large Language Models (LLMs) often suffer from a “memory gap”: parameter-modifying methods are computationally rigid, while inference-time filters cannot retain or reuse defense knowledge across interactions. To address this, we propose Safet-yMem , a novel framework that secures LLMs through a dual-component safety memory sys-tem. SafetyMem consists of Semantic Safety Memory (SSM) , which consolidates diverse jailbreak attempts into a structured knowledge base of attack patterns, and Episodic Safety Memory (ESM) , which maintains an evolving set of procedural rules refined from historical detection failures. Unlike static defenses, Safe-tyMem allows the model to “remember” and adapt to emerging adversarial strategies without parameter retraining. To further enhance robustness, we introduce an adversarial memory expansion mechanism that proactively generates challenging variants to solidify these memories. Experiments on standard and stealthy jailbreak benchmarks show that SafetyMem substantially reduces attack success rates while preserving efficiency and interpretability, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art base-lines across multiple LLMs.

Hao Wang, Ziyi Ni, Huacan Wang et al. · 0 citations