Desc2Fix is a framework for measuring semantic alignment between bug reports, triggering tests, and developer-written fixes. Alignment is operationalized through structured behavioral anchors (e.g., reproduction steps, API/exception cues, expected vs. actual behavior), deterministic similarity metrics (ROUGE, SBERT, CodeBERT, OpenAI embeddings), and LLM-based judgments grounded in coverage, correctness, and specificity. Our analysis covers 2,857 report-test-patch triplets from Defects4J and SWT-Bench using two widely adopted instruction-tuned LLMs from distinct model families. LLMs reliably extract structured signals (up to 90% completeness) and exhibit strong cross-model consistency, yielding a stable semantic input contract for downstream reasoning. However, alignment is highly representation-sensitive: lexical similarity alone is insufficient, full diffs provide the most stable basis for judging report-patch correspondence, and structured summaries trade surface overlap for stronger correspondence at the level of individual actions and entities. Across more than 182,000 LLM-based alignment judgments, both models exhibit systematic optimism relative to humans (1-2 points on 5-point scales) and only modest rank agreement, motivating bias-aware evaluation. Behavioral alignment is measurable but not reducible to similarity, and structured anchors combined with embedding-based proxies provide reproducible signals for ranking and filtering tests and patches. Desc2Fix could support more reliable test generation, fault localization, patch ranking, and bug report authoring.
Wendkûuni C. Ouédraogo, Yinghua Li, Xueqi Dang et al.· 0 citations
Terminal User Interfaces (TUIs) combine the stateful, screen-oriented behaviour of GUIs with terminal deployment and are now common in developer tools. Yet they lack a dedicated testing methodology. We survey 197 real-world TUI applications: only 12% of test code exercises the interface, and 45% of those tests never send input, checking a static frame instead. We turn these applications into a headless benchmark spanning ratatui/Rust, bubbletea/Go, textual/Python, and ink/TypeScript, packaging each as an instrumented Docker image. We record line and widget coverage where reliable, rendered terminal states, and crashes. Under equal wall-clock budgets, we compare four frontier LLMs with random exploration. No model dominates. Random is a strong time-budgeted baseline, but its crash advantage comes from higher throughput: per interaction, LLM guidance is more efficient and uniquely reaches input-gated faults. Automatically deriving launch inputs yields the largest practical gain, enabling applications that otherwise never start. Line coverage poorly predicts crash discovery, weakening it as a proxy for test effectiveness. Automated TUI testing is feasible but far from solved, and honest baselines matter more than model choice. We release the coverage tool tuicov at https://github.com/tui-testing/tuicov and the testing framework tuibot at https://github.com/tui-testing/tuibot.
Chao Peng, Ruida Hu, Ajitha Rajan et al.· 0 citations
LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, yet they frequently hallucinate non-existent software packages, creating exploitable entry points into the software supply chain. We make four contributions to this problem. First, we show that prior evaluation methodologies systematically inflate hallucination rates by misclassifying standard-library modules as hallucinations in some languages. For Python, the overestimation reaches 9.4 percentage points. Second, we evaluate seven inference-time defenses for mitigating package hallucinations, including five guided decoding strategies (Greedy, Contrastive, DoLa, Nudging, and Active Layer-Contrastive Decoding), an iterative self-refinement approach (Self-Refine), and a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based defense.. Across eight models spanning five families and four programming languages (Python, JavaScript, Ruby, Rust), RAG reduces the package hallucination rate (PHR) in 18 of 32 model--language configurations. Third, we introduce Package Utility (PU) to assess whether defenses preserve valid and task-relevant recommendations. Among strategies evaluated, Greedy decoding provides the strongest average mitigation--utility trade-off. Fourth, we stress-test all strategies under adversarial prompts seeded with fabricated package names and find that PHR surges by up to 45 percentage points relative to standard prompts, with Ruby consistently the most vulnerable language (80.9--95.2\%). Under adversarial conditions, RAG and Self-Refine outperform all decoding-only strategies, indicating that robust defense requires either external grounding or iterative self-verification when prompts are actively hostile. Our results recast package hallucination as both a measurement problem and a decoding-time control problem, and they demonstrate that the choice of defense must be matched to the threat model and recommendation utility.
Albérick Euraste Djiré, Iyiola E. Olatunji, Melissa Tessa et al.· 1 citation