Issue localization, which identifies code locations requiring modification from issue descriptions, is a critical step in automated software maintenance. Existing approaches predominantly attempt to directly align issue descriptions with code elements, yet often struggle due to the inherent abstraction gap between the issue description and code implementation. Seeking alternative signals, our theoretical analysis suggests that test suites can serve as executable proxies for requirements, reducing localization uncertainty by 7.73 bits of entropy on average. A large-scale empirical study on 18 repositories validates this premise: existing tests cover 96.98\% of ground-truth files, and the two-hop pathway yields stronger semantic connectivity than direct matching in 82.4\% of cases. Despite their potential, leveraging tests for localization faces two key challenges: the semantic gap separating issue descriptions from test identifiers, and the substantial noise in execution traces from infrastructure code. To address these, we propose IssueExec, which bridges the semantic gap through domain-knowledge-enhanced test representations and filters noise via hierarchical trace analysis. Experiments on SWE-bench Lite show that IssueExec achieves state-of-the-art performance, improving function-level Recall@1 by 41.57\% over the strongest baseline. When integrated into the Agentless pipeline, IssueExec resolves 17.72\% more issues, demonstrating practical downstream benefits.
Jiawei Liu, Yun Lin, Chenyan Liu et al.· 0 citations
Foundation models are increasingly used for perception, reasoning, planning, and action generation in embodied agents, creating security risks that can propagate from digital inputs to physical behavior. Existing surveys often organize threats by mechanisms such as jailbreaks, prompt injection, backdoors, poisoning, or adversarial examples, but these categories do not consistently identify where an adversary first enters the embodied control loop. We present a trust-boundary-centric survey of foundation-model-powered embodied-agent security. Using a first-compromised-trust-boundary principle, we separate attack surface from attack mechanism and organize the system into five layers and twelve attack surfaces spanning the model supply chain, user instructions, context and memory, physical semantic environments, multimodal perception, world state, internal reasoning, task planning, action interfaces, middleware, multi-agent communication, and execution control. Based on 58 attack records and 61 defense records collected through August 15, 2026, we analyze representative attacks, cross-layer propagation, defense placement, and evaluation practices. Our quantitative analysis shows that attack research is concentrated on multimodal perception and action interfaces, while defenses are especially concentrated on action-level and runtime protection. Context and long-term memory, middleware and networking, world-state integrity, and multi-agent trust remain comparatively underexplored. We conclude with open challenges in state provenance, compositional defenses, long-horizon attack propagation, physical realizability, Byzantine multi-robot behavior, and unified closed-loop evaluation.
Jiawei Liu, Jiacheng Guo, Tianwei Zhang et al.· 0 citations
SynAct is presented, an adaptive closed-loop LLM reasoning--acting agent that iteratively diagnoses live synthesis reports and reasons over the current circuit state, retrieved tool knowledge, and historical optimization experience to issue targeted commands to improve timing.
Fangzhou Liu, Peiyi Han, Jiawei Liu et al.· 0 citations