Evaluating whether a vision-language model (VLM) can act through a physical body is challenging. The outcome of an action couples the VLM's decision with motor control. When a task fails, it is hard to tell whether the VLM made a bad choice or the motor controller simply failed to execute it, e.g., losing balance and falling. In this work, we introduce HumanCLAW, an evaluation framework that decouples action decision-making from low-level execution. At every step, a harnessed, off-the-shelf VLM issues an atomic skill command, and the command is translated into a sub-second chunk of continuous full-body motion with real physical consequences, including gravity and collisions. The body can therefore act freely in the physical world, while execution-side disturbances, balance and motor errors, are factored out. What remains measurable is the model's action intelligence: its moment-to-moment choice of what the body should execute next. Based on this framework, we build HumanCLAW-Bench: 1,218 long-horizon, egocentric find-navigate-interact episodes across 41 indoor scenes. We test nine state-of-the-art VLMs and find that none solves the benchmark; the best model reaches only a 16.8% success rate. Recognizing the target is not the bottleneck. What current VLMs lack is embodied self-awareness: they lose track of their own body, failing to tell where it is, whether it has reached the goal, or whether it has hit an obstacle.
Foundation-model policies for robotic manipulation are advancing rapidly on task success, but rigorous evaluation of whether they succeed safely is still lacking. We introduce ManiGuard, a specification-grounded framework for evaluating and improving the safety of foundation-model manipulation, comprising the ManiGuard-Bench task suite and a paired safety-annotated trajectory-generation pipeline. ManiGuard-Bench organizes six contact-rich household task families into 200 locked base tasks along a skill $\times$ constraint taxonomy, with safety specified independently of task success. Each task is evaluated under one in-distribution and four single-axis out-of-distribution perturbations that hold the safety specification fixed, giving 1,000 locked scenarios. Every rollout is runtime-checked by LTL$_f$-grounded automaton monitors over physics-grounded predicates rather than learned classifiers or LLM judges, in simulation and on a physical Franka platform. The pipeline pairs an automated motion-planning generator with human teleoperation, annotated by the same per-step monitor, and directly supports safety-aware fine-tuning; we release 8,000 safety-annotated demonstrations, 40 per base task. Benchmarking zero-shot and fine-tuned VLAs across more than 23,000 rollouts, we find: (i) safety must be evaluated independently of task success, as 6-21% of successful rollouts violate the specification; (ii) fine-tuning on our suite raises safe task completion from near zero to 7.5-29.8% and engaged-and-safe behavior from 16-40% to 51-72%; but (iii) a gap remains that scaling demonstrations does not close, with 21-42% of engaged rollouts still violating, two of six families below 2% safe success for every policy, and these failures persisting under distribution shift and on hardware.