AI agents are increasingly involved in network automation, where they can initiate configuration changes through mediated operational interfaces and assess the resulting state. Nonetheless, operational networks usually span many devices and administrative domains. Realizing an operator's intent requires coordinating agents with distinct authority scopes that define the resources they can access, the operations they can invoke, and the network state they can observe. This division limits the blast radius of an erroneous action but fragments the evidence needed to assess the network-wide outcome. Successful execution of a configuration action proposed by one agent does not establish that remote devices responded as intended or that routing changes reached the required devices. A valid observation may also become stale after a subsequent change. Before the coordinated operation can be declared complete, a trusted assurance layer must collect current observations from the required scopes and determine whether they collectively support the operator's intended network-wide outcome. To address the completion admission problem, we present EvidenceNet, a runtime assurance layer for deciding whether coordinated agent operations have achieved an operator's network intent. Its broker collects the post-change observations required by a completion contract, and its admission gate checks that the evidence comes from the required scopes, remains current, and satisfies the task rules. A verifier agent provides an additional assessment of the observation content. Experiments on live routing networks show that post-change state checks recognize successful outcomes that configuration-action records alone cannot establish. Controlled interventions further show that EvidenceNet rejects completion when otherwise satisfactory observations have the wrong source, have been substituted, or are stale.
In recent years, AI agents have evolved into capable assistants that carry out multi-step tasks in digital environments. The network systems community is beginning to explore these capabilities in operational and experimental settings. However, an agent operating in network systems should not be judged solely by whether it completes the immediate task. The experiment record it modifies must also remain trustworthy. We call this property artifact integrity: the record's claims must remain supported by the available evidence, confined to the scope established by that evidence, and traceable through the artifacts that encode their support. To make this property measurable, we introduce NetArtifactBench, which tests whether AI agents can repair inconsistent records derived from public network-system artifacts while preserving claims that remain supported. The benchmark contains 52 instances with injected inconsistencies ranging from direct contradictions to unstated relations spread across several artifacts. We evaluate 23 agent configurations across three general-purpose AI agent runtimes using deterministic scoring. The average contract pass rate is 65.3 % across 5,980 outputs, but no agent runtime exceeds 30 % when repair requires recovering implicit relations and propagating changes across artifacts. These results reveal a sharp boundary between local correction and complete record-level repair. Therefore, we argue that artifact integrity should become a first-class design and evaluation requirement for AI agents operating on network systems.
Tianzhu Zhang, Wei-Chen Tao, Chang-Gang Zheng et al.· 0 citations
A reference architecture is developed that separates proposal generation from governed execution, identifies recurring integration patterns for LLM-enabled operations, and derives a research agenda for higher network autonomy under explicit assurance, safety, and governance constraints.
Tianzhu Zhang, Changgang Zheng, Shanshan Wang et al.· 0 citations
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