We study the online allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents, where each good must be allocated immediately and irrevocably upon arrival. Against an adaptive adversary, Neoh and Teh [2026] proved that no algorithm can guarantee a positive approximation to proportionality up to one good (PROP1) that is independe...
Saar Cohen, Nicholas J. Teh, Michael Wooldridge· 0 citations
While symbolic regression (SR) has been successfully used in science to discover new equations, its use in financial valuation is hindered by several limitations. Whereas the natural sciences provide objectively correct relationships, financial valuation constitutes a distinct class of symbolic discovery problems, as i...
Kelvin J. L. Koa, Filip Orestav, Sheng-Qiong Wu et al.· 0 citations
We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints. Goods arrive one at a time and must be assigned irrevocably to a feasible agent or to charity, which holds all unallocated goods, while fairness is evaluated only against budget-feasible subsets of every recipient's bu...
Saar Cohen, Nicholas J. Teh, Paul W. Goldberg et al.· arXiv.org· 1 citation
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