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Oindrila Dey

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Open access Aug 2026

Efficient Favouritism with Status Incentives: A Moral-Hazard Game of Delegation and Recognition

This paper studies the interaction between status incentives and organizational design in a two-agent moral hazard framework with limited liability. A risk-neutral principal chooses between two regimes: favouritism, under which one agent receives exclusive decision rights and status recognition for successful project i...

Swapnendu Banerjee, Oindrila Dey, Subhadip Ghosh · 0 citations

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