Large language models have made strong reasoning gains through supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and on-policy distillation, yet these post-training methods are usually evaluated only by final-answer accuracy. We study how they reshape confidence during reasoning. We introduce a three-stage calibration framework that evaluates confidence before, during, and after chain-of-thought generation, corresponding to difficulty estimation, early termination, and answer aggregation. Through a controlled comparison on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, we find that OPD provides the most useful pre-reasoning confidence, SFT gives the strongest online signal for early stopping, and RL produces the most reliable trace-level signal for aggregation. We further show that confidence reliability is position-dependent: RL confidence becomes informative after a path-commitment phase, while OPD confidence is useful early but can become inversely calibrated later. Based on this observation, we propose PosConf, a position-aware confidence strategy that uses confidence only from reliable relative-position intervals. PosConf improves RL answer aggregation by 6.1 points over majority voting and consistently improves OPD early stopping under tight token budgets, with gains up to 4.3 points by avoiding its later inverse-calibration region, showing that \emph{confidence in reasoning models should be used both stage-wise and position-awarely}. Our code is available at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/Post-Training-Calibration.
Shuhao Li, Guodong Du, Anhao Zhao et al.· 0 citations
Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools. This dependence allows defenders to inject deceptive observations that can mislead the agent's decision-making process. However, existing defenses rely heavily on static, isolated artifacts planted in the environment prior to an attack. Advanced agents can progressively recognize and bypass these artifacts, ultimately refocusing their exploitation attempts on the real target. To address this issue, we introduce AgentSnare, a trajectory-adaptive deception system that dynamically unfolds a decoy environment to continually steer the penetration agent away from the real target. Specifically, AgentSnare employs an artifact-construction policy model that constructs candidate artifacts conditioned on the agent's interaction history and decoy state. AgentSnare then validates these candidates and incrementally incorporates valid artifacts into a factually consistent decoy environment, thereby delaying the attack by absorbing its tool calls, diverting its post-entry trajectory within the decoy, and defusing it by inducing completion reports grounded in decoy evidence. Across 15 CVE-Bench web applications and three attacker models, AgentSnare absorbs 46.8% of the agent's tool calls in the decoy and retains 55.9% of post-entry actions there, while 90.0% of completion attempts are grounded in decoy evidence; across all 45 attacker-CVE pairs, no real target is successfully exploited at pass@3.
Ruoyu Wang, Heng Zhao, Renjie Wu et al.· 2 citations