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Xuefeng Gao

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Preprint Aug 2026

Reinforcement Learning for Continuous-Time Jump Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Network Dynamic Pricing

We study reinforcement learning (RL) in Continuous-Time Jump Markov Decision Processes (CTJMDPs) featuring general discrete state spaces (which need not possess a vector space structure) and continuous/discrete action spaces. The setup covers many well-known applications in operations such as multi-product dynamic pricing with capacitated resources (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997). To model the exploration-exploitation tradeoff, we formulate an entropy-regularized continuous-time control problem with stochastic policies. Recent continuous-time RL techniques such as $q$-learning for controlled diffusions in (Jia and Zhou 2023) focus on continuous state spaces $\mathbb{R}^d$ and rely heavily on semimartingale theory in $\mathbb{R}^d$ for their theoretical analysis. Consequently, their methods cannot be directly applied to CTJMDPs with general discrete state spaces, which may lack the algebraic addition and subtraction structures inherent to Euclidean spaces. To bridge this gap, we establish the theoretical foundations of $q$-learning for CTJMDPs and develop model-free $q$-learning algorithms. Compared to na\"{i}ve time discretization and approximating CTJMDPs using discrete-time MDPs, our approach has several conceptual and empirical benefits. Numerical experiments in network dynamic pricing (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997) show that our proposed RL algorithm reliably learns near-optimal policies and consistently outperforms standard benchmark methods, demonstrating superior solution quality and effective scalability to large-scale network instances.

Hui-Ling Meng, Ning-Yuan Chen, Xue-Feng Gao · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Learning under Opponent Unawareness in Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Games

As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics. This paper studies learning in infinite-horizon, nonzero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic games under a radically uncoupled information structure, where players are either unaware of opponents or strategically oblivious, observing only a common state and their own action history. Under this minimal information, we analyze an asynchronous decentralized learning process in which each player independently runs a single-agent $\epsilon$-greedy iterated least-squares algorithm. We prove that, despite being unable to identify the system parameters, players'learning dynamics converge almost surely to the complete-information Nash equilibrium and characterize the convergence rate. We then apply the framework to a dynamic Cournot competition with sticky prices. Numerical experiments validate the theoretical results and show that learning under limited information reduces firm profits under both low and high price stickiness, while total surplus declines and market concentration increases when price stickiness is high. Publicly revealing aggregate market output substantially accelerates convergence and mitigates these welfare losses.

Dantong Chu, Xuefeng Gao, Yufei Zhang · 0 citations

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