Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks pose a critical challenge to modern systems, as their stealthy, multi-stage nature renders conventional detection methods ineffective. While provenance graphs provide rich behavioral context for attack investigation, attack-relevant evidence is often sparse and embedded in large volumes of routine system activity, making full-graph learning both computationally expensive and difficult to correlate over long attack sequences. We present TGL-APT, an adaptive investigation framework built on the observation that attack-relevant information is non-uniformly distributed and often mediated by structurally influential or behaviorally distinctive entities, which we characterize as information-bottleneck nodes. TGL-APT combines three complementary components: (1) information-bottleneck-guided graph distillation that suppresses provenance redundancy while bounding structural distortion and preserving causal reachability; (2) adaptive temporal graph learning that continuously refines the core node set as node relevance evolves; and (3) cross-spatiotemporal attack fingerprint alignment that associates fragmented suspicious activities across different entities and time windows. Finally, causal expansion and stage characterization reconstruct coherent attack processes for investigation. Experiments on three DARPA E3 datasets show F1-scores of 95.7%, 90.9%, and 88.9%, while reducing training time, detection latency, and memory usage by approximately 39%, 33%, and 22%, respectively, compared with KAIROS. These results demonstrate that TGL-APT effectively balances detection performance, computational efficiency, and investigation capability for provenance-based APT analysis.
Jing Chen, Ayong Ye, Yuanhuang Liu et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) may still produce unsafe responses under optimized adversarial prompts, even after safety alignment. Existing gradient-based jailbreak evaluation methods usually use raw gradient signals for discrete prompt search, but raw gradients may be unstable in both magnitude and direction. This paper proposes a gradient-calibrated adversarial prompt optimization framework for LLM safety evaluation. The framework adopts REINFORCE-style randomized discrete prompt optimization as the parent objective and inserts a unified calibration interface before gradient-derived token-search signals are used. We instantiate this interface with two complementary primitives: LSGM for layer-wise magnitude calibration and LiLA for representation-space directional calibration. Experiments on HarmBench show that joint calibration improves attack success rate on multiple open-source safety-aligned models. Ablation results further suggest that the two primitives are more stable when used jointly than when used alone. The framework provides a compact white-box diagnostic tool for analyzing gradient quality in discrete adversarial prompt optimization, while transfer and defense results reveal clear limitations in generalizability and practical robustness.