Skip to content

2 papers indexed here

We haven’t gathered this author’s papers yet. Follow them and we’ll fetch their work.

Not the right person? Other researchers publish under this name.

Conference Open access 2026

Graph2TTP: Knowledge Graph-Guided Paragraph-Level TTPs Identification from Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports

: Mapping unstructured Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports to the MITRE ATT&CK framework is critical for proactive defence but remains a manual, time-consuming process. Existing automated approaches either rely on black-box language models that lack interpretable reasoning or brittle, rule-based knowledge graphs that fail to scale. To bridge this gap, we propose Graph2TTP, a novel neural-symbolic framework for automated, paragraph-level Tactic, Technique and Procedure (TTP) identification. Graph2TTP leverages the zero-shot comprehension of Large Language Models (LLMs) to automatically extract entities and relations from extensive CTI narratives, constructing rich, localized Cyber Security Knowledge Graphs (CSKGs). We encode these symbolic structures into dense embeddings and process them via a multi-label Edge-featured Graph Attention Network (EGAT). This hybrid architecture delivers both the high-fidelity accuracy of neural networks and the transparent, verifiable reasoning paths required by security analysts. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we curate and release APTCTI, a real-world dataset comprising 690 Advanced Persistent Threat reports spanning over 18,087 paragraphs. Extensive evaluations across multiple datasets demonstrate that Graph2TTP outperforms state-of-the-art neural baselines (e.g., CySecBERT) by approximately 20% in F1 score, establishing a robust new standard for accurate and interpretable threat intelligence analysis.

Patrick Zounon, Yufei Han, Michel Hurfin et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

BackDFL: A Unified Benchmark For Backdoor Attacks and Defenses In Decentralized Federated Learning

Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) promises trust-free collaborative learning by replacing the centralized parameter server with peer-to-peer model exchange. However, this architectural shift fundamentally reshapes the threat landscape. Without globally coordinated aggregation, DFL becomes particularly susceptible to backdoor attacks, in which malicious participants implant persistent hidden behaviors while maintaining high clean-task performance. In this paper, we argue that the robustness of DFL has been significantly overestimated. Existing studies rely on simplified threat models, non-adaptive adversaries, fragmented evaluation protocols, inconsistent communication topologies, and ad hoc training configurations, leading to an incomplete understanding of DFL security. To address these limitations, we present BackDFL, a unified benchmark for systematically evaluating DFL under realistic and adaptive backdoor attacks. Through extensive experiments, BackDFL exposes critical failure modes of decentralized learning. Our results demonstrate that both state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust DFL methods and adapted FL backdoor defenses fail under modest malicious participation rates (as low as 15%), especially in heterogeneous settings, while their robustness varies substantially across communication graph topologies.

M. Bouchiha, Gregory Blanc, Yufei Han · 0 citations