Modern AI agents routinely cross trust boundaries: they ingest untrusted content, combine it with privileged instructions, persist intermediate beliefs in long-term memory, and invoke privileged tools. This creates an attack surface in which malicious payloads can enter through model inputs and cause harmful tool actio...
Zhen-Hua Zou, Sheng Guo, Qiu-Yang Zhan et al.· 0 citations
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) offer a promising mechanism for safeguarding the intellectual property of on-device Large Language Models (LLMs). To overcome the inherent computational bottlenecks of TEEs, existing TEE-Shielded LLM Partition (TSLP) methods apply efficient obfuscation schemes to computationally in...
Han-Yi Zhou, Chen-Yang Li, Yuan-Zhe Pang et al.· 0 citations
The emerging Internet of Agents enables LLM-powered agents to discover peers, invoke tools, and delegate tasks across organizational boundaries. Existing protocols increasingly define how agents exchange messages, but not how an agent proves its identity, authorization, advertised capabilities, or accountability after...
Zhen-Hua Zou, Sheng Guo, Qiu-Yang Zhan et al.· 0 citations
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