Contextualization is addressed with contextualization, re-deriving each finding's severity from evidence in the environment where the finding lives, and evaluates it in a production field study of 9,967 vendor HIGH findings from two commercial cloud security platforms across eight real production environments.
Language model agents are increasingly deployed to automate everyday digital chores from managing emails and social media to handling banking and bills allowing users to step away from supervision. However, this capability also exposes sensitive information to phishing. Safe execution requires distinguishing malicious...
Rafid Ahmed, Joseph Fioresi, Mubarak Shah et al.· 0 citations
Detection engineers must translate threat reports, forensic observations, and hunt hypotheses into precise, testable rules. General-purpose large language models (LLMs) can draft such rules, but often produce invalid YAML, incorrect log sources, unsupported fields, or overly broad detection logic. This paper presents \...
As small language models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed on resource-constrained and on-device platforms, including as components of agentic systems, the integrity of locally stored model parameters becomes an important safety concern. We investigate whether safety-sensitive behavior in LLaMA-2-7B-Chat is concentrated...
M. Karamat, Christian García· 0 citations
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AI agents are increasingly granted autonomous access to sensitive user data and third-party services, making effective permission management a critical security challenge. Existing permission models, however, typically rely on flat permission structures that fail to balance security with usability: fine-grained confirm...
Jinhao Zhu, Xiao Huang, Kevin Tseng et al.· 0 citations
Behavioral watermarking embeds an owner identifier in an LLM agent's high-level action choices, giving provenance without touching output tokens. Prior agent watermarks break in two ways. First, all three prior schemes bind the watermark to the exact action symbol, so renaming a tool desynchronizes decoding even when t...
Su-Xin Ji, Hung-Tao Wan, Shao-Xuan Chen et al.· 0 citations
Mathematical problem solving often requires deterministic computational steps that agents delegate to tools and implicitly trust. Yet tools can fail silently, returning plausible but incorrect results. How well can agents detect and correct corrupted tool call outputs? We study this through a controlled corruption fram...
Self-improving LLM agents increasingly distill successful experiences into persistent, reusable skills. Existing skill attack methods corrupt this learning pipeline by injecting malicious triggers, behaviors, or false facts into individual experiences or extracted skills. However, such attacks are easily detected, and...
Li-Zhi Zhang, Xin He, Dian-Xuan Fu et al.· 0 citations
Static-analysis checker synthesis requires agents to interpret a defect specification, inspect a repository, implement analyzer-specific logic, and refine the checker through repeated compilation and analysis feedback. Existing coding-agent benchmarks focus on tasks such as patch generation or vulnerability detection a...
Hang He, Li-Sheng Wang, Hao Chen et al.· 3 citations
Frontier AI treaties or agreements on limiting computation require external verification; an external auditor must be able to confirm how much computation actually ran and that parties are adhering to the agreement. Analogue, off-chip measurements such as power draw provide an information channel for verification. It i...
Tom Kimpson, Mauricio Baker, Emlyn Graham· 0 citations
Cyber threat analysis increasingly depends on evidence distributed across vendor advisories, vulnerability databases, and threat intelligence sources. Turning these fragmented observations into timely decisions requires models to connect technical severity with evolving exploitation evidence and available defensive act...
Luo-Xi Tang, Yu-Qiao Meng, Ankita Patra et al.· 0 citations
Backdoor-defense leaderboards print a clean-accuracy drop and read it as removal cost. Measured on the poisoned victim alone, the drop cannot separate removal from what the defense does to any model, and inherits the victim's start, which for three of BackdoorBench's sixteen attacks is a configuration file: WaNet, BPP...
Research Manager Mike Walker reflects on a career spanning hacker culture, cybersecurity, and AI, sharing lessons about trust, teamwork, leadership, and why solving difficult problems requires curiosity, judgment, agility—and an understanding of the rules. The post Learn the rules: The hacker mindset appeared first on Microsoft Research.
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.