The aim of interpretability shifts the aim of interpretability from finding human concepts inside models toward discovering and characterizing the representational structures that are native to the models themselves and might affect their behaviour in unpredictable ways.
Abstract
Large language models are usually interpreted through concepts that humans already possess: truthfulness, refusal, deception, personality, harmfulness, and related categories. This paper asks whether models may also represent and use distinctions for which no adequate human concept exists. We call such internal structures xeno-representations, and their study xeno-interpretability. We distinguish the human-interpretable semantic space from the xeno-semantic space: the region of model-native representations for which no adequate human conceptual counterpart is available. We show that the space of possible internal distinctions in an LLM is substantially larger than the space available through finite human descriptions. We then separate experimental identification from semantic interpretation: an internal representation may be reproducibly located, geometrically characterized, causally manipulated, and linked to downstream behaviour even when its semantic content cannot be adequately expressed in human terms. On this basis, we sketch an empirical programme to identify xeno-representations. We finally examine the implications for AI safety and multi-agent systems, where model-native representations may propagate and stabilize across interacting agents while remaining only partially visible through human-readable communication. Xeno-interpretability therefore shifts the aim of interpretability from finding human concepts inside models toward discovering and characterizing the representational structures that are native to the models themselves and might affect their behaviour in unpredictable ways.
It is found that while all models show sensitivity to existential presupposition across syntactic embeddings, determiner types and contextual cues, their behaviour differs markedly in strength and systematicity, with NLI-fine-tuned autoregressive models exhibiting the most coherent and stable projection patterns.
Marie-Léontine Wörgötter, Shiyang Lai, Sebastian Schuster· International Conference on...· 0 citations
It is argued that consciousness is a sine qua non for understanding which is absent in the understanding of AI systems and that the age of AI demands a reformulation of the notion of understanding itself.
The contemporary debate over machine consciousness begins from a concealed assumption: that the object called"AI"already constitutes the kind of entity to which consciousness could belong. This paper challenges that assumption by separating phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspect...
It is proposed that LLMs can serve not only as benchmarks for human-model alignment, but also as tools for investigating the nature of pragmatic phenomena and their relationship to linguistic theory.
A. Lombardi, Alessandro Lenci· International Conference on...· 0 citations
It is argued that demonstrating internal incoherence is a necessary precursor to AI alignment as well as a broader phenomenon of epistemic instability in generative AI wherein models fail to reliably maintain coherence with respect to their own prior outputs.
Pegah Nokhiz, Aravinda Kanchana Ruwanpathirana, Helen Nissenbaum· 0 citations