The value of commitment in a network evidence game

Contracting for LLM Delegation: Moral Hazard in Technology and Effort Choice

We extend the standard Principal-Agent framework to scenarios where the Agent selects from a suite of technologies, each characterized by a distinct cost-capability profile. This framework is increasingly critical in the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), where Agents choose both a model and an associated effort leve...

Robust Incentives

Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies Working

Mechanism Design for Alignment and Control

A framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown is developed and applied to stylized examples of sandbagging and an alignment--interpretability trade-off.

Going beyond suffering in public goods games when low contributions are inefficient: experimenting with two institutions.

We analyze a public goods game with linearly increasing marginal returns to contributions, leading to a non-monotonic group payoff. By allowing the incentive to freeride to persist at all contribution levels, we preserve the usual social dilemma of voluntary public goods provision. We compare two conditions in which...

A stochastic interaction between two firms

In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s belie...