Three-sided mobility-energy market design as a multiperiod stochastic assignment game
Abstract
As mobility service providers (MSPs) and energy providers (EPs) expand electric vehicle ecosystems, models are needed to understand their interactions within a three-sided market. Existing frameworks often overlook the temporal interdependencies between mobility and charging demands. We address this gap by proposing a bilevel problem as an assignment game overseen by a market regulator. The upper level optimizes service pricing to maximize platform profitability. The lower level models a multi-stakeholder equilibrium using a scalable, link-based Perturbed Utility Route Choice (PURC) framework. The evaluation time frame is divided into discrete intervals, capturing the temporal lag between mobility and charging demand via an empirical affine function. We solve the model by chronologically decomposing the lower level into interacting mobility service and recharge subnetworks. Numerical experiments on the expanded Nguyen-Dupuis network reveal several key insights. First, a critical charging capacity threshold exists; operating below it forces a severe reduction in the deployable fleet and creates localized transit deserts. Second, modeling endogenous operating costs reveals a concave profit trajectory, demonstrating that total profit maximizes at a specific fleet size just before market saturation. Third, optimal dynamic pricing operates within a narrow range, where peak pricing acts as a steady revenue driver and off-peak pricing serves as a highly sensitive operational buffer. These findings provide actionable strategies for coordinating fleet sizing and charging infrastructure deployment.