This thesis develops formal frameworks that make responsibility and causation mathematically precise and algorithmically verifiable, both for attributing responsibility and for identifying the interventions that reduce risk.
Abstract
AI systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, where they behave non-deterministically, act under uncertainty, and form part of larger multi-agent systems without central control. When such systems cause harm, two questions arise: who is to blame, and what could have been done to prevent it? This thesis develops formal frameworks that make responsibility and causation mathematically precise and algorithmically verifiable, both for attributing responsibility and for identifying the interventions that reduce risk. It is organised in three parts.
Part I introduces logics of group responsibility in probabilistic multi-agent systems, based on the risk a group could jointly have avoided, with sound and complete axiomatisations, decidability, and efficient model checking. Part II proposes a new definition of actual cause, Dynamic Causality, studies temporal extension of causal models and their computational properties. Part III connects the two, inducing concurrent game structures from causal models to reason about responsibility in organisational structures.
The thesis argues that once non-determinism, strategic ability, uncertainty, and time are made explicit, responsibility and causation admit precise and verifiable formal interpretations.
This paper argues that moral responsibility can fail under technologically mediated conditions in two structurally connected ways. First, agents may act from motivational states significantly shaped by external formative processes whose influence remains partially opaque to reflective awareness. Second, institutions ma...
A growing literature on “agentic AI” — autonomous software agents that plan and execute multi-step actions on a principal’s behalf — has revived the thesis that such systems open a responsibility gap: because the deploying principal neither intends, foresees, nor controls the specific actions an autonomous agent select...
When a multi-agent system answers correctly, it is tempting to conclude that its agents shared, checked, and used information as intended. Yet a system can break one of its collective mechanisms, the rules that govern how agents route, admit, store, and act on shared information, and still return the right answer, whil...
While artificial intelligence (AI) offers promise as a tool for efficiency and access to justice, in public administration it also threatens to reproduce the perversity in Franz Kafka’s parable “Before the Law”: systems that mimic legality while rendering the law opaque and unreachable. I develop the concept of “Digi...
A two-dimensional design space is introduced in which both dimensions are organised into five operational levels, making the coupling explicit and navigable, and six architectural tactics for adjusting a deployment’s position within it are proposed, offering a shared vocabulary for compliance-aware agentic AI design.
D. Safin, Dian Baltaa, Timon Sengewaldb et al.· EGOV-CeDEM-ePart 2026· 0 citations
This work introduces a notion of retrospective (backward) counterfactual responsibility, which quantifies an agent's accountability for outcomes resulting from a given strategy profile, and demonstrates how to compute stable strategy profiles in which agents trade off responsibility against expected reward.
Chunyan Mu, Muhammad Najib· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
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