Hatred, determinism, and control

Abstract

Many legal philosophers are sceptical about the justification for aggravating punishment based on motives. I argue that these sceptical positions may overlook an important dimension of moral and legal responsibility in that responsibility for motives does not hinge on "volitional control" — the agent's ability to manage their motives as they arise. Instead, it pertains to what is known as “the source control”, or the agent’s role in originating or endorsing their motives over time. From this standpoint, holding individuals responsible for motives involves considering whether they have, in some sense, endorsed or cultivated these motives as part of their identity, thus implicating them as genuine authors of their actions in a deeper sense. This distinction between volitional and source control may, therefore, offer a more nuanced approach to assessing the role of motives in criminal responsibility, particularly in cases like hate crimes where the motives are central to the offence.