The Negative and Positive Criticism of the Metaphysical Idea of Progress

Abstract

This article examines the main features of the metaphysical understanding of progress. Drawing on Georg Simmel’s concept, the article identifies five core components of this perspective: history is purposive; this purpose is valuable; it emerges immanently from historical development; it presupposes a universal subject of history; and it assumes continuity between historical epochs. The article then discusses several major critiques of the idea of progress as formulated by Jacob Burckhardt, Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Feliks Koneczny. Subsequently, it analyses the ontological and axiological criticism of the idea of progress developed within the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Finally, the paper highlights the characteristics and advantages of a non-metaphysical conception of progress, encapsulated in the formula: There is no progress “of” history, but there is progress “in” history. The main aim of this article is to present this interpretation. Historical positions are analysed solely to identify arguments within them that support this systematic thesis.