Henryk Elzenberg’s Analytical Existentialism

Abstract

Elzenberg constructed a philosophical system that, was essentially limited to axiology and anthropology. Its foundations rest on two axioms: axiological absolutism and anthropological pessimism. Elzenbergism could be described as analytical existentialism. This may sound like an oxymoron, but the paradox disappears when we clarify that while its subject matter is existentialist, its method is analytical. According to Elzenberg, values are concrete entities that exist objectively (contrary to subjectivism – “value resides in things, not in the mind”). However, they appear in two forms, which he described as perfect and utilitarian. The former is absolute (binding for everyone), while the latter is relative (dependent on the subject). Perfect values manifest in nature, but their value originates beyond it – given in the very possibility of their realisation, as an ontological duty. We arrive at the following characterisation of the two types of values: WU = that which satisfies a natural need.WP = that which is as it ought to be – by the judgment of ontological duty and in the eyes of an autonomous subject. Natural needs are strictly defined by human biology (they are of various orders and branches, ranging from broad categories, such as nourishment, reproduction, sleep, and body regeneration, to more specific ones like eating, drinking, breathing, and entertainment, etc.). Satisfying these needs is a guarantee of life and also provides pleasure (though ordinary hedonism derives pleasure from “higher levels” of satisfaction, while negative hedonism, or asceticism, stems from avoiding the lack of satisfaction). However, the pleasure derived from the realisation of perfect values is of a different nature – non-natural. This pertains to an individual’s character. Just as in his axiological absolutism, Elzenberg drew upon Plato and Augustine, in his anthropological pessimism, he followed primarily Augustine – though not without reservation. He espoused a form of historical pessimism (concerning the collective: “Things are bad, and they will not improve”) as well as substantial and personal pessimism. In his view, “the Third Reich was not an aberration in the history of humanity, but its vanguard”; and the human being, at best, is “not a devil, but a swine”. He rejected Socratic ethical intellectualism (characteristic of the Greeks in general), as well as Rousseauism, maintaining that one may consciously commit evil but does so merely by virtue of their animalistic nature – by disregarding moral duty (a view of evil akin to that found in Gnosticism).