The Dark Forest argument holds that a civilization that detects another should strike it at once, so detection, and any transmission that invites it, is danger. Existing models make the detected civilization the object of the strike and play the strike on a roster the attacker knows; where they advise restraint, the advice rests on steps that fail in the cases it is for. This paper takes the object of hostility to be remaining uncontrolled capacity to warn or retaliate, on a roster no attacker ever knows to be complete. A first strike is rational only if the timing benefit of what it removes is at least the disclosure loss from every leftover that learns of it. A leftover able to bring about the attacker's destruction, by striking or by warning one who can, costs the attacker its whole stake, and the actors the attacker has never found are such a leftover that no strike removes. A Dark Forest believer that strikes first therefore accepts the strike as the last attack it will ever make; the strike is rational only if waiting would raise the cost of removing the target by about the attacker's whole stake. A transmission that reveals the sender gives a receiver a posterior over the sender's capacity, not a target, and proves that the sender can warn. A receiver need not be hostile; for one that is, the sender is a witness it must pay for, so a beacon delays every hostile that cannot be nearly sure of removing the sender's forces, and a free beacon harms its sender only through sure kill, whole-stake urgency, a receiver that fears no one the sender could warn, or an opening hidden from the sender. Messaging to extraterrestrial intelligence (METI) is judged by reach and by what a receiver must believe to act, not by fear of punishment, and a beacon deters by witnessing: the sender need not be able to strike anyone, only to tell someone who can.
Debates about cyber strategy lean on a handful of high-profile operations—Stuxnet, NotPetya, SolarWinds—as if they were clean tests of competing theories. But the evidence we get to see is filtered by actors with their own reasons for revealing or concealing, and that filtering is not neutral. We call the result a “vis...
F. Ferazza· International Journal of Inf...· 0 citations
A central design goal of settlement systems is that security should not degrade when transaction values are high. Using Ethereum’s Proof-of-Work era, we show that Proof-of-Work can fail this test: higher transaction fees—the reward for a successful attack—cause miners to deviate from honest behavior and fork the chain,...
Pablo D. Azar, Maryam Farboodi· Staff Reports· 0 citations
We have all witnessed media reports of the aftermath of mass victim attacks. We see the carnage, and we know that attackers do not show mercy. Victims were innocent and were targeted simply for being a part of a small or large group of people. Whether a bomb, semi-automatic weapon, knife, or vehicle, the attacker strik...
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) watches network traffic and decides whether what it sees is ordinary activity or an attack. Modern systems learn that decision from labeled examples and routinely report accuracies above 99 percent. That number does not answer the question a defender actually faces, which is...
When an encoded attack passes a content guard, the guard either never represented the payload's harmful content or represented it and failed to act. End-to-end attack success rate reports one number for both, yet the two have opposite remedies: one is a representational limit that more safety training cannot reach, the...
Haoyu Zhang, Yi Feng, Shi-Bo Zheng et al.· 0 citations
This paper analyzes how AI could persuade humans in key settings toward decisions that compromise the development, containment, oversight, and governance of AI itself, and provides a blueprint for assessing the associated risks.
Joshua H. Levy, Mick Yang, Kellin Pelrine· 0 citations
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