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Proof-Carrying-BPF Programs for the eBPF Verifier

Sep 2026 · Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on eBPF and Kernel Extensions · 0 citations · 31 references

TL;DR

A userspace version of the kernel verifier is developed and appended to the BPF backend to increase the class of programs accepted by the Linux eBPF verifier without increasing its complexity.

Abstract

This paper proposes proof-carrying-BPF programs as a mechanism to increase the class of programs accepted by the Linux eBPF verifier without increasing its complexity. To accomplish this vision, we develop a userspace version of the kernel verifier and append it to the BPF backend. The BPF backend generates proofs with symbolic evaluation where the kernel verifier is not able to prove safety. The kernel verifier checks proofs with an in-kernel proof checker and accepts the program when the proof is valid. This coupling of the userspace BPF verifier to the BPF backend addresses the limitations of the recent BCF framework, such as latency due to multiple kernel-to-userspace transitions and the dormant verifier state during userspace verification. Our prototype successfully verifies all 360 objects of the BCF suite — drawn from the Calico and Cilium datapaths, BCC, and Inspektor Gadget — that the kernel verifier previously rejected.

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