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Less Than a Bit to Rule Them All – Key Recovery from Randomness Leakage in ML-DSA

· 1 citation · ⚡ 1 influential · 39 references

TL;DR

It is shown that not all leaky signatures carry information about the secret subkey, and the notion of informative signature relations is introduced, which allows us to define a preprocessing step, called filter-and-shift that leads to ILWE instances that require a smaller sample amount.

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