Security analysis of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution under electromagnetic leakage attack
TL;DR
This paper presents an effective attack targeting the transmitters of the MDI-QKD system by exploiting leaked EM signals and shows that a convolutional neural network can recover the modulation information with an accuracy of over 97%.
Abstract
The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol can eliminate side channels in detectors of QKD systems, which makes the transmitter security especially crucial. However, we find that the radio-frequency (RF) ports of the electro-optic modulators at the transmitter leak electromagnetic (EM) signals correlated with the modulation information, rendering the transmitter vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. In this paper, for the first time, to our knowledge, we present an effective attack targeting the transmitters of the MDI-QKD system by exploiting leaked EM signals. Experimental results show that a convolutional neural network (CNN) can recover the modulation information with an accuracy of over 97%. Subsequently, we characterize the impact of the attack on the system security and conduct corresponding theoretical models. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures. The findings of this work contribute substantially to advancing the security of practical QKD systems.