A novel technique to eliminate plays with suboptimal infixes is introduced, which enables focusing on a finite part of the infinite configuration graph in order to solve the game via approximation to continuous bidding games with overall complexity in EXP.
Abstract
Bidding games are graph games in which a token is placed on a vertex, each player starts with an initial budget, and a simultaneous auction determines which player moves the token; the players'budgets are then updated accordingly. Motivated by scenarios such as resource-allocation systems in which agents receive periodic rewards (e.g., credits, energy) while competing for control, we introduce and study bidding games with rewards, in which, at each vertex, players may receive additional budget, incentivizing desired behaviors. We focus on reachability discrete poorman bidding games with rewards (DPBGr). The main challenge when compared to discrete bidding games without rewards is that the configuration graph is infinite. To this end we introduce a novel technique to eliminate plays with suboptimal infixes. This enables focusing on a finite part of the infinite configuration graph in order to solve the game via approximation to continuous bidding games with overall complexity in EXP. Finally, we discuss a new type of strategy, usable on a subclass of DPBGr, which guarantee a winning strategy for the reachability player. Membership in this subclass is shown to be in NP.
This work introduces an independently randomized formulation in which each stopping rule is represented by an adapted, nondecreasing cumulative stopping process, and identifies an exact-potential subclass with a closed-form threshold equilibrium.
Reward rate is a key performance criterion in cyber-physical and robotic systems where time, workload, and coordination costs are limiting resources. We introduce reward-rate congestion games, where agents seek to maximize reward per unit execution time. The direct reward-rate game is generally not an exact potential g...
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Angelo Fanelli· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
In evolutionary game dynamics, strategies undergo mutation and natural selection. Owing to practical limitations, many studies simulate evolution in a restricted strategy space. This is especially true for repeated games, where long-run strategies can be arbitrarily complex. It can be challenging to find a suitable s...
Philip LaPorte, Pranav Velavan· Proceedings of the Royal Soc...· 0 citations
We introduce and study Auctions with Pacing Strategies (APS) games, a full-information model in which utility-maximizing bidders compete across many simultaneous first-price auctions, each choosing a single pacing multiplier that uniformly scales their values into bids. We settle three central questions. First, we show...