Secure Password Management in Terminal Environments Using Encrypted USB Storage to Mitigate Key logging
TL;DR
This research proposes a hardware-dependent trust model that uses encrypted USB mass storage devices as secure and trusted vaults to deliver a user’s credentials through a protected channel, and addresses critical vulnerabilities in conventional password managers, including "leaky autofill" and memory-based credential exposure.
Abstract
Securing a user’s input is vital for protecting their privacy and credentials during authentication and for preventing credential theft or leakage. Key logging attacks represent a persistent and evolving threat to authentication security in terminal environments, where malicious software intercepts keystrokes to capture sensitive credentials. Our research proposes a hardware-dependent trust model that uses encrypted USB mass storage devices as secure and trusted vaults to deliver a user’s credentials through a protected channel. By implementing a virtual disk-encrypted volume with AES-256 encryption and a Win USB-based secure communication path, the system separates authentication from the host's standard keyboard input path and reduces exposure to software-based keyloggers operating at both the user and kernel levels. This approach addresses critical vulnerabilities in conventional password managers, including "leaky autofill" and memory-based credential exposure, while maintaining usability through automated, site-specific injection mechanisms