Clarifications on the concept of a norm as a function

Abstract

This article responds to criticisms raised in Revus by Jaap Hage and Pascal Felix Meier regarding the author’s proposal previously developed in Norms as functions. Its main aim is to clarify the scope of the thesis according to which norms—especially prescriptions and prohibitions—can be represented as functions that assign values of correctness to actions and omissions. After situating the proposal within the broader context of legal theory on norms, the paper explains the functional structure of norms, specifying the domain and codomain of normative functions and distinguishing them from other types of relations examined in the logical analysis of law. The paper also discusses the differences between this model and alternative functional approaches, such as conceptions that treat norms as correlations between cases and solutions or as conditional rules in input/output logics. Finally, it clarifies the principles of normative rationality that make intelligible the idea of norms as guides for action. The article argues that conceiving norms as higher-order functions provides a unified representation of how norms distribute correctness and incorrectness across classes of actions, while avoiding certain logical-semantic difficulties in norm theory and offering a flexible framework for analysing normative systems.