Where Should Society Draw the Line? A Social Choice Approach to Collective Consent

Abstract

Society constantly has to determine the boundaries of what it deems acceptable, from legislative decisions to the guardrails governing autonomous systems. We initiate the axiomatic study of collective consent: given individuals'attitudes toward options, which options should receive societal consent? We organize our analysis around three principles: sufficient support, minority protection, and dominance by decisively better options. Each captures a distinct reason for withholding societal consent from an option. For each principle, we develop a corresponding solution concept that transparently implements the principle and is canonical in a mathematically precise sense. For example, for minority protection, the resulting concept is a consent-adapted version of Moulin's Proportional Veto Core. Balancing multiple principles simultaneously is more challenging. To address this, we develop a game-theoretic characterization of our veto core that naturally gives rise to a family of related concepts. From this family, we identify the Approval-Weighted Veto Core as particularly desirable. By making minorities'blocking power depend on the approval support of the options being challenged, it smoothly interpolates between proportional minority protection and majority support. Experiments on five datasets spanning high-stakes decision-making (such as political elections, ethical AI evaluations, and moral decision-making) show that solution concepts violating a principle in theory also violate it empirically.