(k)-SwordStamp is designed: semantic watermarks with order-robust detection over sub-sentence units, reducing sensitivity to attacker-chosen structure at a small quality cost.
Abstract
Semantic watermarks tie the mark to sentence meaning rather than token choices, promising robustness to content-preserving edits. However, the detector only observes attacker-supplied text, which can be reworded, reordered, or resegmented to evade detection without content loss. Rewording, reordering, and resegmentation all cause embedding displacement: detection tests embeddings different from those selected during watermarking and can therefore lose the mark. Our adaptive embedding displacement attack (EDA) admits all three edits under a single objective that maximizes this displacement. It uses a public paraphraser and surrogate encoder without access to the provider's generator or secret key. At a 5% false-positive rate (FPR) and content-preservation threshold $\bar{q}=90\%$, EDA successfully removes the mark on between 32.6% and 47.9% of documents across four schemes, the highest among the tested attacks. Therefore, EDA evaluates the schemes'robustness more thoroughly than passive paraphrasing. To address these vulnerabilities, we design (k)-SwordStamp: semantic watermarks with order-robust detection over sub-sentence units, reducing sensitivity to attacker-chosen structure at a small quality cost. Against k-SwordStamp, the strongest no-box attack we test is an EDA variant adapted to its design, with a 10.8% attack-success rate. A stronger EDA with access to the provider's detector and secret key reaches a 39.7% attack-success rate, compared with 65.5% on k-SemStamp. Our code is available at https://github.com/D-Diaa/SwordStamp.
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