The results guarantee security against fixed-target forgery under a single-signature-exposure model under the assumption of a finite supply of quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field.
We propose an information-theoretic authentication protocol based on a finite supply of long quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field, where the effective key length after one signature exposure is the residual dimension $r=n-\ell$. A computationally unbounded adversary observes one valid classica...
Linear-decomposition attacks can break public-key schemes without recovering the secret algebraic action: when a target public state lies in a known linear span, its decomposition coefficients transfer through the unknown action to reveal the shared value. We study a setting in which the adversary uses only the public...
The amount of secret key that can be obtained from a quantum key distribution run depends on both the physically observed error rates and the mathematical bounds used to certify security. For finite datasets, conservative bounds force users to discard a substantial fraction of the potentially available key. Here we fur...
M. Tan, Bartosz Regula, Marco Tomamichel· 0 citations
Currently, existing group signature schemes with user-controlled and sequential linkability (GS-UCSL) suffer from critical limitations: they lack post-quantum security, cannot efficiently revoke malicious signers, grant excessive tracing power to group managers (GM), and rely on heavy revocation lists or secure channel...
We make progress towards the impossibility of quantum-computation, classical-communication (QCCC) key agreement by giving the first unconditional polynomial-query attacks that tolerate imperfect completeness in the following settings. First, we give a quantum attack on protocols with arbitrarily many rounds in which bo...
Fuyuki Kitagawa, Ryo Nishimaki, Ági Villányi et al.· 0 citations
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