Embodied cognition and the neural basis of syntax: Reinterpreting Kant, Chomsky, and Humboldt
Abstract
This paper aims to argue that, under typical developmental conditions, syntactic productivity is grounded in embodied cognition, emerging primarily through the vocalization of human praxis within a causally structured world. The core claim is that the mapping from action structure to clausal structure follows a specific pattern: causal graph motifs in motor planning map onto predicate-argument templates in perisylvian networks via learned alignment. This mapping is operationalized by specifying how motor planning circuits scaffold combinatorial encoding in LIFG and LSTG. Non-action semantics, including complementation, quantification, and abstract concepts, emerge through metaphorical extension and conventionalization of action-based templates. While alternative pathways exist, such as statistical learning from text, embodied praxis represents the typical ontogenetic pathway. The paper generates falsifiable developmental predictions, addresses cross-linguistic typology and clinical dissociations, and outlines implications for cognitive psychiatry. This perspective grounds intelligibility in the synchronization between body, action, memory, and objective causality.