We study normal-form noncooperative games corresponding to Common-Pool Resource (CPR) situations. A social planner aims to regulate the use of the resource and acts as a leader in a two-stage game. The followers are non-cooperative players who choose a Nash equilibrium representing optimal extraction levels. Due to uncertainty about the state of the resource, in this article we consider the possibility that production, which depends on the aggregation of strategies, is a set-valued mapping. We examine appropriate selections of this mapping and analyze the corresponding two-stage games where a social planner regulates the use of the resource and act as a leader. We prove the existence of a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium and discuss its properties.
We consider a resource allocation problem with strategic agents that have private stochastic satisfaction functions and local constraints. To achieve a global optimal solution, we propose an incentive mechanism that induces a game among the agents. For the payment function of the mechanism, we construct a family of qua...
Shaya Garjani, M. Shokri, H. Kebriaei· 0 citations
In decentralised priority coordination, agents announce priority levels and a shared resource serves them in decreasing order, as at an unsignalised intersection; the levels form the decision layer of a hierarchical controller. Such interactions are routinely replaced by a potential game, i.e.\ by a common objective, f...
Zhi-Hao Lin, Jiang-Lin Lan, Anh-Tu Nguyen et al.· 0 citations
The chance-constrained correlated equilibrium concept provides a robust coordination technique for self-interested agents whose costs are uncertain to a central coordinator, but the number of joint actions considered in its computation grows exponentially with the number of agents. We propose an exact-one resource-assi...
Jaehan Im, U. Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil· 0 citations
This work considers multi-agent coordination with arbitrary information networks among the agents using a game-theoretic approach. A system designer aims to assign local utility functions to the agents to guide their actions toward a desired system objective. The performance of the assigned local utilities is measured...
Increasingly, resource allocation games are being proposed to model team coordination in denied communication environments. Of particular interest is understanding the impact of communication denial on the quality of emergent team coordination. In this work, we consider the situation with an arbitrary communication net...
Brandon C. Collins, Colton Hill, Philip N. Brown· 0 citations
We deal with controlling a complex social network in which agents have actions and opinions that coevolve, mutually influencing one another. We consider an input consisting in broadcasting information to a target set of agents with the objective of steering the population, initially at a consensus, to a different conse...
Roberta Raineri, Meng-Bin Ye, Lorenzo Zino· 0 citations
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