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IntentFuzz: A Protocol-Aware Fuzzer for Automated Invariant Violation Detection in Intent-Based Cross-Chain Bridges

Sep 2026 · 0 citations · 33 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work proposes IntentFuzz: a protocol-aware fuzzer that recovers a bridge's intent structure and deposit/fill function roles directly from unannotated Solidity source, then synthesizes multi-step fuzz sequences using an LLM-based fallback to help build call arguments.

Abstract

Cross-chain bridges move value between blockchains. Intent-based bridges are a variant where a solver fulfills a user's declared outcome and an off-chain settlement layer later reconciles the fill against the deposit. Existing smart-contract fuzzers and static analyzers only flag known-bad code patterns or require protocol-specific hand-written assertions. This work formalizes a taxonomy separating invariant violations, safety properties a contract must enforce locally, from settlement exposures legitimately delegated to the off-chain settlement layer, and proposes IntentFuzz: a protocol-aware fuzzer that recovers a bridge's intent structure and deposit/fill function roles directly from unannotated Solidity source, then synthesizes multi-step fuzz sequences using an LLM-based fallback to help build call arguments. IntentFuzz recovers the correct intent structure in 9/9 benchmark protocols and classifies deposit and fill functions with 100% recall and 82% combined precision; across a corpus of 77 manually labeled contracts, it reaches 79.5% bridge-classification precision and 97.2% recall, and among confirmed bridges, struct selection reaches 88.6% precision and recall while deposit and fill classification each reach 100% recall. On 23 planted-bug mutants, IntentFuzz attains 100% recall and 100% precision, executing 273 templates (507 transactions in a median of 14ms per template). Across 24 real-world deployments, it confirms 17 genuine invariant violations under heuristic-only input generation, rising to 22 with its LLM-assisted tier enabled, spanning eight vulnerable GitHub repositories, each finding reproducible against public, deployed bytecode.

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