In this paper, I consider several issues related to the concept of iden-tity—the concept that is in many ways related to Heda Festini’s early philosophical interests. I speci fi cally focus on discussion of the issues in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. I contrast two competing conceptions of identity—the objectual (according to which identity is a relation in which every object stands only to itself) and the metalinguistic (according to which identity is a relation between coreferential names)—and consider reasons these authors had for accepting or discarding one or the other. In addition, I consider how issues concerning identity relate to issues concerning identity statements.
Most theorists have offered different accounts of reference fixing for names, demonstratives, and indexicals. Indeed, this variety can seem an inevitable response to a certain class of hard cases. Here, I will offer a unified account of reference fixing equally capable of handling these cases. Then, I will show how t...
Eliot Michaelson· Philosophy and Phenomenologi...· 0 citations
How can the phenomenon of reference to particular individuals be explained? This book examines the ongoing debate about the semantic relevance of Keith Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of descriptions and about the semantic foundation of direct reference. A new solution to this debate is...
In this article the problem of the so-called ‘coinciding objects’, i.e. the question whether a substantially homogeneous thing is something ontologically different from the corresponding ‘piece of stuff’ it is made of or not, is examined from a pragmatical and language-analytical point of view. Instead of recurring to...
The paper presents the most important assumptions of Henryk Elzenberg’s formal axiology concerning the concepts of ought and obligation. For this purpose, the formal language of deontic logic was used. In this language, the HE theory was presented, which was characterized both from the syntactic and semantic side. Usin...
In my (2020) I defended an intentionalist understanding of Chomskyan linguistics whereby standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words, phrases and phonemes don’t exist, but are “intentional inexistents” merely represented in our brains. Reviewers complained this was in tension with “externalist” theories of re...
Georges Rey· The Monist· 0 citations
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