Optimal Strategy for Sea Toll Transport Governance Policy from the Perspective Of New Institutional Economics: A Case Study of South Sulawesi
Abstract
The Sea Toll (Tol Laut) program is a strategic maritime logistics initiative implemented by the Indonesian government to reduce price disparity in remote and underdeveloped regions, particularly in Eastern Indonesia. However, current governance mechanisms remain fragmented and face multi-agency institutional problems, leading to high transaction costs and suboptimal collective payoffs. This study investigates the optimal strategy for managing the Sea Toll program through the lens of New Institutional Economics (NIE), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and Game Theory. Focusing on the South Sulawesi region as a central maritime hub, a mixed-methods approach was employed, involving a Systematic Literature Review (SLR), stakeholder questionnaires, and mathematical modeling. The Output-Oriented BCC DEA model highlights widespread inefficiencies in budget allocations and route operationalizations, primarily driven by trade asymmetry and empty return cargo. Furthermore, the Game Theory simulation establishes that maintaining the status quo (fragmented governance) produces an inferior Nash Equilibrium due to sectoral egos and pervasive moral hazard. In contrast, an integrated governance structure—enforced through formal institutional changes—significantly improves service determinants, namely responsiveness, reliability, speed, safety, flexibility, and cost, yielding the highest collective payoff. The study provides strong empirical justification for restructuring maritime subsidy policies and integrating state maritime authorities under a unified institutional framework. Received: 07 July 2026 / Accepted: 31 August 2026 / Published: September 2026