Beyond Representation
Abstract
What is conceptual engineering about? In this paper, I defend the superiority of the pragmatist account of concepts over the two main contenders in the field – the representationalist account and the psychological account. I evaluate the different contenders with respect to their ability to make sense of the practice of conceptual engineering along two dimensions. First, the feasibility of conceptual engineering. If conceptual engineering is (almost) impossible to achieve because concepts are not the kinds of things that can be revised, there is no point in engaging in such a practice. Second, the distinctiveness of conceptual engineering in relation to other projects such as empirical inquiry or conceptual analysis. If conceptual engineering ends up being more of the same, it is unclear why it deserves the current level of interest, let alone its own field. I argue that the pragmatist account of concepts is the most apt in explaining why conceptual engineering is both feasible and distinctive. Finally, I respond to a possible objection, i.e., that my proposal will only appeal to those who are already sold on pragmatism, by showing the value of taking pragmatist concepts as the targets of conceptual engineering in practice, even if one ultimately rejects pragmatist metasemantics.