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Open access
Sep 2026
Against Beliefless Knowledge
There is wide agreement on the entailment thesis, according to which if S knows that p, then S believes that p. Some philosophers, however, have attempted to present counterexamples to the entailment thesis, where subjects know that p without believing p. Proponents of the entailment thesis have typically responded t...
Jinwoo Heo
· Episteme · 0 citations
Book
Sep 2026
Explaining Knowledge
The book presents a novel, abductivist theory of knowledge and argues for it over its two main rivals: safety theory and causal explanationism. According to abductivism, a belief constitutes knowledge when, given the way it is formed or maintained, the best explanation of its being true rather than false lies in the...
Sven Bernecker
· 0 citations
Open access
Sep 2026
Reasoning, Rationality, and (In)Coherence
Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. I propose a novel way to understand structu...
Hossein Ayati
· Journal of the American Phil... · 0 citations
Open access
2025
HOW DO SKEPTICS “KNOW”: DUAL-REPRESENTATION VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE
ABSTRACT The skepticism in the field of epistemology has never lacked advocates and attackers. In order to defend skepticism and answer the question of how skeptics can have knowledge, this article offers a two-step response to the perennial skeptical challenge. First, it strengthens Putnam’s classical “brain-in-a-vat...
Xun-Lie Ma
· Kriterion · 0 citations
Sep 2026
There Is No Such Thing as Doxastic Wrongdoing
People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, and apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has starte...
D. Enoch, Levi Spectre
· Philosophical Perspectives · 12 citations
Sep 2026
Epistemological Casuistry: What's Not Wrong With Motivated Reasoning
We often accuse others, and sometimes ourselves, of engaging in, as psychologists are apt to term it, “motivated reasoning.” This is the charge that the collection, use, and interpretation of information have been warped by one'sdesires, andis often regarded as amounting to a charge of epistemic irrationality. In a 2...
Yuval Avnur, Dion Scott-Kakures
· Philosophical Perspectives · 0 citations