A Prospect-Theoretic Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Phosphogypsum Governance from the Technology–Organization–Environment Perspective

Abstract

Phosphogypsum (PG) governance is a persistent challenge in industrial solid waste management, particularly in regions where large-scale stockpiling, uneven resource-utilization capacity, and policy implementation pressures coexist. Existing studies have paid considerable attention to regulatory instruments and recycling technologies, but less is known about how governments, waste-generating enterprises, and waste-utilizing enterprises adjust their strategies under bounded rationality. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating prospect theory. The technology–organization–environment (TOE) perspective is used as a parameter-identification lens to capture three external conditions: policy incentive intensity, enterprise governance input, and resource-utilization technology maturity. Based on case-informed parameter calibration from Guizhou and related policy-industrial evidence, numerical simulations are conducted to examine evolutionary paths, equilibrium conditions, and parameter sensitivity. The results show that PG governance may evolve from systemic inaction to policy-driven transformation and then to market-oriented sustainability. Technological maturity plays a threshold role, while excessive loss aversion can destabilize cooperative evolution. The interaction analysis further indicates that policy incentives are effective only when they are aligned with enterprise treatment behavior and viable market-entry conditions. These findings suggest that PG governance should move beyond short-term administrative intervention toward staged policy support, technical standardization, and market cultivation.