Research on Equilibrium Strategies and Mechanism Design of Stakeholders in Rural Industrial Integration Development from the Perspective of Game Theory

Abstract

Rural industrial integration is a key direction for implementing the rural revitalization strategy, extending agricultural value chains and improving rural economic sustainability. However, this process involves complex interactions among stakeholders such as government, enterprises, farmers, and cooperatives, and is often constrained by interest conflicts, information asymmetry, insufficient risk sharing, and cooperation failure. From the perspective of game theory, this paper treats stakeholders as decision-makers in strategic relationships and analyzes their behavioral logic and interest conflicts during rural industrial integration. The study reveals the micro-mechanism of interest imbalance in noncooperative games, with particular attention to the distortion effects of strategic choices under information asymmetry. It further explores how effective contract design, institutional arrangements, and platform mechanisms can guide stakeholder behavior toward long-term stable cooperative equilibrium. Through theoretical modeling and simulation analysis, the study shows that cooperative game mechanisms can significantly improve system welfare. Effective mechanism design is therefore essential for resolving incentive incompatibility, risk-sharing constraints, and information asymmetry problems in rural industrial integration.