God and the View From Nowhere: De Se Knowledge and Divine Omniscience
Abstract
I argue that classical non-indexical models of divine omniscience are insufficient to account for divine agency conceived as both libertarian and morally responsible. Drawing on work on essential indexicality, I formulate a Self-Location Constraint (SLC): an omniscient agent capable of robust contrastive responsibility must not only know all truths, but also know de se that it is the agent actualising a particular world rather than relevant alternatives. I argue that volitional contrast, actualisation asymmetry, and responsibility across alternatives generate explanatory demands that purely third-personal models of omniscience cannot satisfy. These demands are best explained by irreducibly de se content. I then assess three responses: reductionism about de se cognition, semantic stratification designed to preserve divine simplicity, and necessitarianism, which rejects genuine modal alternatives. I conclude that, given libertarianism and robust contrastive responsibility, theism requires a form of omniscience that includes self-locating knowledge. Although developed within a theistic framework, the structure of SLC generalises to any necessarily unique agent with libertarian powers and exclusively non-indexical cognition.