On the Metametaphysics of Law: A Revisionary Perspective
Abstract
This article proposes a revisionary approach to the meta-metaphysics of law. It challenges the growing tendency in analytic jurisprudence to treat questions about the nature of law as metaphysical problems that require employing explanatory metaphysical tools (e.g., grounding). Instead, it argues that metaphysical claims are better understood as expressions of semantic rules, inferential relations, and ongoing conceptual negotiations. On this account, engaging with metaphysical questions about law does not entail uncovering the fundamental structure of reality; it involves conceptual work and empirical investigation. From this standpoint, the paper defends a non-explanatory perspective, emphasising the role of language in determining how we come to think and talk about legal reality. Building on Thomasson’s ‘normativist’ account of metaphysical discourse, it develops a non-descriptivist analysis of legal statements, especially those concerning law’s nature, and provides a pragmatist methodology for answering metaphysical questions of law that avoids commitment to discovering worldly metaphysical facts.