The resulting research prototype binds each deterministic policy decision to the exact policy source, commits a privacy-minimizing record at a caller-selected synchronization boundary, and returns an Ed25519-signed receipt that states whether that boundary completed.
Abstract
An AI audit record is useful only if its durability and trust boundary are explicit. Returning a guarded decision before any durable write minimizes latency, but it cannot guarantee that evidence survives an immediate crash. We rebuild RuntimeGuard-AI around this constraint. The resulting research prototype binds each deterministic policy decision to the exact policy source, commits a privacy-minimizing record at a caller-selected synchronization boundary, and returns an Ed25519-signed receipt that states whether that boundary completed. After restart, the engine validates framed records, manifests, shard placement, sequence continuity, and replay identity. A separate attestation path groups committed records into chained, signed Merkle epochs that an auditor verifies with an externally obtained key. On an Apple M4 Pro at four worker threads and 2,048-byte prompts, buffered signed evidence reaches 27,193 requests/s with 141.9 microseconds median latency. Per-record data and full synchronization reduce throughput to approximately 242 requests/s and raise median latency to 16.0 ms. Sealing a 100,000-record signed epoch takes 97.0 ms. The result is a measured durability-latency trade-off, not a"free"asynchronous audit path. The prototype does not prove model execution, prevent a compromised signer from forking history, or establish legal conformity.
What deterministic software can learn from a completed MCP failure result alone is studied; request arguments, schemas, discovery history, authen- tication state, transport metadata, host policy, and host policy, and host policy, and ap- plication state are outside that boundary.
The Agent Flight Recorder captures each agent action as a structured, canonically serialized event binding eight semantic fields from intent through execution to provenance, and periodic on-chain anchoring of epoch roots lets any verifier with the disclosed payload and Merkle proof check the record independently, witho...
Laurent Bindschaedler, Quentin Botha, Christoph Siebenbrunner· 4 citations
PACE (Policy-Attested Contract Execution), a transaction-level authorization framework that interposes between an LLM-based agent and on-chain execution, is presented and frame its claims as logic-level safety within a reproducible benchmark rather than deployment-ready DeFi security.
Rabimba Karanjai, Yang Lu, Richard Williamson et al.· 1 citation
A controlled-invalidation suite spanning browser, tool/API, and multi-agent workflows is built, which preserves the user goal and payload shape while invalidating the authority relation before durability, and is a reporting and runtime-design lesson: endpoint success is a utility metric; authorized commit is a security...
A leakage analysis of each projection is given, an incident in which a first-cut projection preserved the identifier it was written to remove is reported, and the residual trust the design does not eliminate is given.
To the knowledge, what is missing is a deductive account of this recovery boundary, including a result over arbitrary recovery policies that can read the source side but not the sink’s acceptance record, and how long that evidence must survive.
Andreas Andreakis· 2 citations· ⚡1
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