Prerequisites for Nietzsche’s Perspectivism

Abstract

The article examines the philosophical suppositions of the development of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of perspectivism and analyzes its relationship to relativism, pluralism, and skepticism. The aim of the study is to identify the intellectual origins of perspectivism and to demonstrate its distinctive nature in relation to foregoing philosophical traditions. The methodology of the work is based on the historical-philosophical reconstruction, comparative analysis, and the hermeneutic interpretation of philosophical texts. The author explores the influ-ence of ancient relativism and skepticism, medieval nominalism, the philosophy of the French Enlightenment, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s pluralism, and Schopenhauer’s transformation of Kantian philosophy on the for-mation of Nietzsche’s conception of perspectival knowledge. It is argued that Nietzsche’s perspectivism cannot be a variety of either strong or weak relativism since it is grounded on the pluralistic ontology of the will to pow-er and presupposes a hierarchy of interpretations rather than their equivalence. Tally the results, perspectivism constitutes an independent philosophical conception, in which the problem of truth is transferred from the do-main of epistemology to that of ontology and living practice.