From ‘A Coherence Theory’ to Triangulation

Abstract

A central theme in Davidson’s and Quine’s philosophical disagreement over many decades concerns the relationship between meaning and evidence and its basic role in the theory of knowledge. Using the recently discovered 1986 Stanford conversations, I revisit their debate over these issues, focusing on the question of their role in Davidson’s development. The conversations highlight an important transition in Davidson’s criticisms of Quine’s naturalized epistemology, where he more explicitly favors the distal stimulus over the proximal stimulus in translation and interpretation. I argue that this proximal-distal analysis serves to clarify his critical stance towards Quine’s view and helps to further his own externalist approach to epistemology. A brief overview of Davidson’s more explicit commitment to externalism and his appeal to the device known as triangulation is provided in order to highlight their central role in his alternative ‘epistemology externalized’. Using further exchanges from the conversations I conclude by wondering to what extent this view can been seen as a contribution to naturalized epistemology, suggesting that it points to a more fundamental break with Quine than Davidson seems to allow.